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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TOM NORTHERN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

-vs.-

7973
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al.
Defendant and Appellant.

-·
Brief of Appellant
_,'

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action. was brought by Tom Northern against
the General .I\Iotors Corporation for damages arising out
of an accident to a 1951 one and one-half ton Chevrolet
truck owned by Tom Northern and sold to him by the
Central Motor Company at Grand Junction, Colorado.
Plaintiff alleges that the defendant General Motors
Corporation was negligent in the manufacture, in that

1
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the truck was defective and dangerous for use; that they
failed to properly inspect, test and perfect the steering
mechanism; plaintiff further alleges that General Motors
Corporation was negligent in the inspection of the truck.
The defendant General Motors Corporation admits
having manufactured and assembled the truck, but denies
that the truck was defective and denies that it was negligent in the manufacture and inspection of the truck while
it was being manufactured and assembled and before it
was sold and delivered to a dealer.
In particular, plaintiff alleges that the steering
mechanism on the truck broke and that as a result of
such breaking the truck went out of control and upset,
causing personal injury.
In this case the pitman sector shaft of the steering
mechanism was found to be broken after the accident.
The broken parts (Plaintiff's Exhibits Gl, G2, G3 and
G4) are in evidence and also photographs of the same
parts (Plaintiff's Exhibits J, K, L, 0, P, and W; Defendant's Exhibit 4) and can illustrate and explain
better than can be written here. Defendant's Exhibit 7
is a blueprint in evidence, which shows the relation of
the pitman sector shaft in the operation of the steering
mechanism.
~rhe

accident in question occurred about a mile and
three-quarters westward from a mountain pass in the
State of Nevada known as Sacramento Pass on Highway
No. 6 between Delta, Utah and Ely, Nevada (R. 86, 87)
2
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when the plaintiff, the driver of the truck, was going
to,vard Ely, Nevada (R. 86).
The road at the point of the accident is a downward
grade from Sacramento Pass and is part of a large
compound curve and it was after making a gradual curve
to the right where the truck turned over (Plaintiff's
Exhibits Q, R and S).
The plaintiff testified ·he was 1n the business of
cleaning cesspools and septic tanks (R. 73) and that on
1Iay 18, 1951 he traded a Dodge truck for the Chevrolet
truck in question. The transaction was made with the
Central Motor Company of Grand .Junction, Colorado
(R. 76). After the purchase, plaintiff placed a 740 gallon tank and a sludge pump upon the truck (R. 77; Plaintiff's Exhibit A). After working in Colorado and Utah,
plaintiff was in Monticello, Utah, on or about June 5th
and he had driven the truck about 975 miles (R. 80, 81).
Wliile traveling between Monticello and Price, Utah, the
plaintiff experienced the following (R. 81) :
''A. Yes, sir. Coming down a little g-rade that
I was driving between 50 and 60, no more than
60; I don't know if it happened, it seemed like it
was a lo"\v road, or mayhe my wheels "",vould need
balancing, or something made it so rough in the
road.

"Q. Hovi' ·would y:m describe that?
''A. A thrill sort of like a near vvea-ving.
'' Q. How much of a weave was that? Did you
cross over the center line of the highway?

3
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•'A. No, sir, it was just a slight weave in the
road, wobbly.
'' Q. Did the truck leave the bard surface of
the highway?
"A. No, sir, it did not."
Also, on cross-examination and regarding this same
experience plaintiff testified (R. 116, 117):
''A. You mean the feeling I got from

it~

''Q. Yes.
''A. It was near in the steering wheel. It
gave me a funny feeling.

'' Q. You felt the impulse, whatever it was
in the steering wheel f
"A. Yes sir.

"Q. At that time. Was it a sensation of the
steering wheel just for a very few moments going
to the right and to the left?
"A. No sir, you couldn't say it was that way.
It was just a wiggle.

"Q. Just about what you are illustrating, is
it notf
"A. Yes sir.

'' Q. You are illustrating of it going quickly
from the right to the left?
"A. Yes sir. You couldn't say it went no
foot and a half or two feet. Just little bobbles."
Upon arriving at Price, Utah, plaintiff had driven
the truck and its added equipment about 1300 miles and
at that place took the truck into the Redd Motor Com4
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pany of that city for its thousand mile checkup. Among
other things complaint was made of the front end "kind
of acted funny" but the Redd :Motor was not apprised
of the previous "weaving" experience (R. 82, 83). The
truck was then driven from Price, Utah, to Grand Junction, Colorado and back to Price, Utah; thence to Salt
Lake City; thence back to Price, Utah; thence to Spanish
Fork, Utah; thence to Delta, Utah, and thence to the
place of the accident and (except for a distance immediately prior to the accident) the truck operated perfectly (R. 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86).
After leaving the top of Sacramento Pass and
traveling downgrade toward Ely, Nevada, the plaintiff
testified that while traveling near sixty miles per hour
he went on down around a curve and then ''the first
thing I knowed I was in the middle of the road from the
right side; and I turned by truck back into the right
side again, and when I went to turn it again, which the
steering wheel had completely turned plumb around and
the truck went on about its business." (R. 89.)
On cross-examination and on this same subject,
plaintiff testified that after leaving the top of Sacramento Pass and after rounding a curve to the right he
got over to the left of the center line of the highway and
that he gradually pulled it back to the right hand side
(R. 127). Also plaintiff admitted describing the occurrence on previous deposition as follows (R. 130, 131):

''Q. I will ask you whether or not at that time
in the deposition you made this statement: 'Well,
5
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it was just like, oh, just didn't haYe the blacktop
out, you know, to the ditch. It was a smooth road
there. And I snatched it back up on the road and
pulled it back. When I pulled it back I never could
straighten it up again.'
"A. That is right, sir.
"Q. You made that statement, did you not?

''A. Yes sir, I did.
'' Q. I will ask you, !1r. Northern, whether or
not, on that occasion, you made this statement:
'No sir. When I· tried to turn it back to the right
again, after pulling it from the right side, pull
it to the left, and after trying to straighten it
back to the right again, I could not straighten it.
That's when I hit the brakes.'

''A. Yes sir, I did.

"Q. And right after that do you recall this
question: 'And what \vas the sensation on the
steering wheel as you tried to pull it back from
the right side of the road~'
' ' 'A. Well just wasn't nothing to turn it back
with.' You made that statement, did you not?

''A. Yes sir, I did.
'' Q. And will you listen to the following questions and answers, Mr. Northern, on the same
occasion on the deposition: 'Q. You didn't try
to spin it at all back~'

" 'A. Well it done happened, sir. Didn't have
enough time to do all tl1at. Just steering it, I
imagining around eight, ten inches ; something
like that.'
" 'Q. Then

yo~

started tipping over f

" 'A. It was going over than.
6
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~'

'Q. You were going over then f

" 'A. Yes sir. '
"Did you testify to that effect upon the taking
of this deposition 1
"A. I don't recollect that, sir.

"Q. Do you deny now, Mr. Northern, that you
made such a statement on that occasion 1
''A. No sir, I do not deny it. I just don't
recollect it.

'' Q. And you could have made such a statement, is that right?
''A. Possible.''
Plaintiff's Exhibits 0 and 11 and Defendant's Exhibit 3, admitted in evidence, clearly shows the course
taken by plaintiff's truck to the time of the upset.
Plaintiffs then read into evidence the deposition of
one Gordon \Yertsderfer. 1'Ir. W ertsderfer lived about
two miles from the summit of Sacramento Pass (R. 159).
He related that his occupation was that of a machinist
and combination \velder for forty-five years and that he
had handled, examined and fashioned forms out of steel
(R. 163); that he had observed metal surfaces but that
he had no experience in regard to steering mechanisms
nor in the automotive line (R. 172, 173). On voir dire
examination this witness testified that he had learned
by practical experience and that he had no schooling or
technical training (R. 168, 169) and that his formal education was through the eighth grade (R. 172).

7
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Mr. Wertsderfer testified that on June 15, 1951 he
received word of an accident from one Mike Drakulich
who runs a place of business on Sacramento Pass and
that he went to the scene of the accident and saw the
upset truck (R. 159). He saw the marks on the highway
as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit 0 (R. 160). This witness
examined the truck and "in looking at the steering arm"
he found that it was broken and "that one-sixth of it
had a flaw in it, that showed traces of rust where the
flaw had been created" (R. 173). (These conclusions
were allowed over defendant's objections.) He concluded
that the rust condition was in the neighborhood of ''six
weeks old" (R. 173). Mr. Wertsderfer testified that he
called the attention of his wife and Dr. Drakulich to the
broken part at the scene of the accident. (R. 176). On
cross-examination witness W ertsderfer described the
broken part as chrome steel, eighteen percent carbon,
medium carbon steel and upon further examination he
had no knowledge of any other remaining elements of
the metal, or its composition and structure. (R. 177-184
incl.) Mr. Wertsderfer agreed that the "splines" on
Exhibit G-2 were twisted and that it would take great
force to twist these splines on an inch and one-eighth
shaft. The witness then described ·where he saw the
discoloration on the faces of the fracture by marking
the areas on Exhibit 4. No evidence of crystallization was
present in the Exhibits. He stated that a crack or opening to allow rust could be visible to the eye if the opening
was "a half a thousandth or over" (R. 200). In conclusion and on cross-examination this witness testified

8
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that he had no idea how the "flaw" got in the part in
question (R. 202). He later surmised that a "jolt" in
the factory might have caused it (R. 201) although he
had no knowledge of how the parts are made or put
together in an automotive plant (R. 202).
The deposition of ~Irs. Gordon W ertsderfer was
read by the plaintiff. l\Irs. Wertsderfer testified that
her husband called her attention to the broken part and
she observed signs that appeared to be rust (R. 204). On
cross examination and at the time the deposition was
taken, l\Irs. W ertsderfer could not see the rust or discoloration that she had referred to upon her direct
examination.
Plaintiff then presented Mr. Renold 0. Jenson, who
stated that he was in the auto repair business in Salt
Lake City, Utah, and that he was the person who purchased the damaged truck from Mr. Northern (R. 205).
Mr. Jensen testified that in the repair of the truck he
replaced the pitman sector shaft; that the front wheels
and drag link were not damaged (R. 138) and he described further repair work (R. 207). The witness gave
his opinion that there was no blow on the front end
because the front end was still on the truck (R. 208).
He further described ''stops'' to prevent the wheels
being turned beyond a certain angle (R. 208). In respect
to lubrication of the broken part he stated that a sleeve
or bushing covers it and that it has an oiled surface and in
his opinion rust would not accumulate when the parts
are assembled (R. 208, 209).
9
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On cross-examination the attention of the witness
was directed for the first time to the apparent twist on
the splines of the broken part (R. 209) and he stated
that it would require some type of pull to produce such
a twist and take a lot of force to break the sector shaft
and that a sudden jolt may do it (R. 210). From his
experience, 1\fr. Jenson testified that it depends upon a
lot of factors which part fails-sometimes one part fails
-sometimes another, and it depends upon where the
force is applied (R. 211, 212).
Plaintiff read into evidence the deposition of Frank
Snyder. The witness described himself as a machinist
of forty years experience (R. 216) and at the time of
the deposition he was and had been employed as a machinist for Kennecott in Ruth, Nevada, for twenty-five
to thirty-five years (R. 217). The witness had never done
any testing of metals (R. 219) and no special studies (R.
220), no knowledge of chemistry or chemical content (R.
232), hardness (R. 233, 234), heat treatment (R. 234),
load requirements (R. 234, 235), modern milling processes (R. 238), examined metals under magnification
(R. 245), and that he "never made a study of it" and
that it was really none of his business (R. 245).

fie testified that on June 15, 1951, he was traveling
in the vicinity of Sacramento Pass and he came upon a
wrecked truck and that the front end was all "busted".
He noticed a broken piece and, over objection, stated
that there was a "flaw" in it (R. 218). He described
the piece as having been "cracked, and the crack had
10
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been oxidized" (R. 223). He described a stain mark the
color of rust; that the part was fractured before it was
machined ( R. 226). He examined the part to see if he
could see anything and stated that the parts have been
cleaned up (R. 226). As to the time the oxidation existed,
Mr. Snyder stated that it would be longer than three
weeks but concluded by stating that he would not pass
an opinion and if he did it would be a pure guess (R.
229).
On cross-examination Mr. Snyder admitted to his
lack of knowledge of modern steel, its chemistry, composition or structure (R. 230, 231, 232 and 233). Mr.
Snyder, for the first time, noticed that the splines or
serrations were twisted and immediately concluded that
there had been an excessive strain on the part, not only
excessive but a "great" strain on the part (R. 236). Mr.
Snyder, upon viewing the part at the scene of the accident, concluded that the rough surface of the fracture
indicated crystallization but upon deposition failed to
find any such evidence (R. 240). In explaining this situation, the witness stated that his first examination had
been a year or more ago and, in fact, the District Attorney
(Mr. Collins) had a "heck" of a time convincing him
that he had seen the wreck (R. 240). Also, in regard to
the rust the witness was asked to point out the areas
where the rust was seen and, in response, replied : ''I
can't show it to you. 'Taint there.'' (R. 241). Mr. Snyder
then further concluded that the "flaw" was in the metal
when the part was new but that it did not show on the
outside (R. 242). He then described the area of the
11
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''flaw" as the entire surface of Exhibits G-1 and G-2
with the exception of the rising edge (R. 242). Mr.
Snyder testified that an examination under magnification
might change his opinion of the problem but he refused
such opportunity, stating, "I can't pass an opinion now,
after this length of time. Why, hell, I wouldn't give an
opinion on it" (R. 244, 245).
The deposition of Mr. Jon Collins of Ely, Nevada,
was read by the plaintiff into the evidence of the case.
Mr. Collins was an attorney-at-law and District Attorney
of White Pine County, Nevada (R. 263). Shortly after
this accident Mr. Northern consulted Mr. Collins regarding his case and the facts and site of the occurrence were
investigated by Mr. Collins (R. 263). In the course of
such investigation, Mr. Collins made various observations and measurements and identified the various photographs in evidence of that place (R. 265). Testifying
concerning the alternate marks shown on Exhibit C,
Mr. Collins viewed nine such distinct marks averaging
about four yards a part or a distance in excess of 108
feet (R. 266). On the left hand side fifteen such alternate
marks were found by him also averaging in excess of
four yards apart, or a total distance in excess of 135
feet (R. 267). The right side left the surfaced part of
the road and was on the graveled shoulder before turning
abruptly to the left for a distance of twelve to fifteen
yards (R. 279). At that point the right hand wheel left
the macadam about a foot or foot and a half and there
was no object which was struck or hit (R. 269). Mr.
Collins described his idea of what caused the solid

12
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marks which abruptly crossed the highway to the left
(R. ~70, 271). Mr. Collins describes the course of the
Northern vehicle as ''the first swing was slightly to the
left, at which time the wheels did not leave the macadam.
Then there was a swing to the right, at which time the
right wheels left the macadam. And they left the macadam, as I stated previously, about a foot or a foot and
a half, then there was a violent swing to the left'' (R.
272). By use of his automobile speedometer, the attorney
then measured the distance from the point where the
marks were first observed to the place where they left
the highway on the left. This distance was .12 of a mile
or 633.6 feet and in addition to this the truck went into
a barrow pit, hit and uprooted a substantial tree (R. 273)
which was a distance of twenty to thirty yards (R. 275).
At Ely, Nevada, lVIr. Collins examined the truck and
observed the broken part (R. 276) and later had possession of this part after its removal from the vehicle
(R. 277). He further observed that the front end was
"considerably scratched and banged up" (R. 281). Mr.
Collins later sent the broken part to Mr. Earl R. Parker,
Professor of Metallurgy, University of California, to
be examined and received a report from that expert (R.
282, 283, 284).
The plaintiff caused the deposition of Earl R. Parker
to be read into evidence. Mr. Parker related his qualifications which revealed eminent qualifications as a metallurgist and professor of metallurgy and he has specialized
in the study of service failures (R. 286, 287).

13
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Exhibits G1, G2, G3 and G4, were shown to Mr.
Parker and he testified they had the same appearance as
the parts previously sent to him by one Jon Collins of
Ely Nevada and that he made a report to Mr · Collins
'
'
by letter
of August
24, 1951 (R. 219). It was stipulated
that Exhibit No. 5 is a true and correct copy of that
report (R. 289, 290). Concerning his examination and
opinions, Professor Parker testified as follows:
''A. No. The magnification used for the examination was about twenty-five times the actual
size so that we could scrutinize the surface of the
fracture rather closely. The things that I looked
for on such a fractured surface are characteristic
surface markings which indicate, by comparison
with other things that I have seen in the past
with known histories, the nature of the surface
failure; and in particular I always check for evidence of old cracks.

"Q. Now, as a result of the examination you
made and as you have described it, you arrived
at certain opinions and conclusions in regard to
the exhibit, did you not?
"A. That's right. And those were stated in
the letter referred to as Exhibit 1 (T.C.E. 5).

"Q. Now, did you find in your examination
any reason to believe that the metal contained in
the fractured parts was defective 1
"A. No.

"Q. And did you arrive at any opinion that
the part was sound before the fracture?
''A. Yes. There was no evidence of any defects in the cross-section of the part that had
fractured.

14
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"Q. And did you arrive at an opinion, Professor Parker, as to the cause of the fracture or
failure of Exhibit P (T.C.E. G)~
''A. Yes. I would rather refer to the letter,
which states as one of the conclusions of the
exa.mina tion 'The fracture was caused by a sudden
overload (rather than by fatigue-a type of failure that progresses slowly over a. long period of
time.)'
'' Q. And is that your opinion

now~

"A. Yes, it is."
Exhibit 6 was then examined by the witness and from
those photos of the micro-structures he testified that
there was nothing to indicate either mechanical defects
or metallurgical defects in the sense of improper heat
treatment (R. 291). Professor Parker stated in his
testimony that the structure and properties of the metal
were suitable for the purpose for which it was used in
the motor vehicle ( R. 292). The hardness figures (thE:}
results of a chemical analysis and hardness test by Mr.
Bradshaw, chemical analyst at the University of Utah
were stipulated) as a result of test were normal for this
type of metal and the chemical composition was suitable
for use in parts of this type according to Professor Parker (R. 293). Upon examining the twisted splines of
Exhibits G1, G2, G3, and G4, Professor Parker testified
that the failure was due to a single overload rather than
a series of small overloads and that a torsional forte
was applied to the part (R. 293). In regard to the problem of rust or exidation, Professor Parker further testified (R. 295) :
15
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"A. I don't recall seeing any oxidation on the
surface of the fracture at the time that I examined it. If there had been any more than superficial oxidation on the surface, I would have noted
it because of the fact that one of the things which
is important in the study of such fractured surfaces is to look for evidence of old cracks which
can be detected by local oxidation in the region
of the old cracks, which produces a darkened area
and consequently contrasts sharply with the remaining brighter portion of the fractured surface.
There was no such evidence of an old crack insofar as I could determine at the time that I examined it.
'' Q. And the time you are speaking about
was some time toward the latter end of August
of the year 1951 7

"A. Yes."
On cross-examination this same witness stated that
the force on the pitman arm was from the rear forward
to produce the clockwise twisting of the splines (R. 295}.
He also testified that such a fracture would require a
very large force and a force higher than a driver could
exert through the steering wheel (R. 296). Upon being
examined as to the time factor of the fracture, Professor
Parker testified (R. 298):
''A. That's right. It is impossible to tell from
the examination of the fractured part alone anything about the time factor except that this is the
fracture which is characteristic of a single large
overload which occurred at one time in contrast
with the different kind of fracture which occurs
over a long period of time by progressive growth
of a crack due to repeated small overloads.
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"Q. All right. Which are, as I understand,
you have been referred to the fatigue type of
fracture.
''A. That time-consuming type .of fracture is
called a fatigue fracture because of its gradual
failure over a period of time.''
The defendant General Motors Corporation, after
having made a motion for dismissal in its favor, called
Mr. -Millan (Mike) Drakulich, who testified that he owns
a tavern on Sacramento Pass about forty-six miles east
of Ely, Nevada and that he also operates a small stock
ranch (R. 316). He was a friend and neighbor of Mr.
Wertsderfer (R. 317). Mr. Drakulich described the road
from the summit of Sacramento Pass to the place of
the accident as having six curves. The witness first saw
the truck pass his place of business and it ''was traveling
a little faster than trucks usually do, down that grade''
(R. 319). Then about a half mile below his place of
business he saw a cloud of dust and someone told him
there was a wreck down there and he went down to the
place of the accident (R. 317, 318). He found the truck
on the left side about twenty-five or thirty feet up on the
bank (R. 318). Mr. Drakulich went after Mr. and Mrs.
Wertsderfer for aid and at the scene Mr. Wertderfer
showed him the broken parts (Exhibits G1 and G4). He
looked at the parts and saw no rust or discoloration,
although Wertsderfer attempted to point out that it was
''oxidized'' (R. 320).
Mr. Wally Birch was produced by and testified for
the defendant, General Motors Corporation. Mr. Birch
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is a resident of Ely, Nevada, since 1936 and has been in
the automotive repair and garage business sinc'e he was
a young boy (R. 322). He runs a tow service and has
seen and examined many wrecks and examined many
broken parts, including those that have failed by reason
of being defective (R. 323). Mr. Birch received a call
and arrived at the scene of the accident on the morning
,following the occurrence (R. 323). He examined the
scene, including the truck, tank, and the marks on and
off the highway (R. 324). He formed the conclusion
that the truck had rolled over four times and the tank
was completely separated from it (R. 325). On that
occasion Mr. Drakulich was present and he and Mr.
Birch examined the broken steering part and he testified
that there was no rust on the part or the faces of the
fracture (R. 326, 327). He described how the truck was
removed and taken to Ely, Nevada (R. 327). In describing the truck marks as shown by Exhibit "M ", he testified that the marks alternated, first one mark on the
right, then one mark on the left (R. 328). On cross
examination, Mr. Birch testified that those marks could
be made while the front wheels were controlled by the
steering mechanism ( R. 329). He further testified during
the trial that he could see a bit of rust on the part when
it was exhibited to him at the triaJ, but that he did not
see such a condition when he first saw the part on June
16, 1951 (R. 331).
Mr. Roy J. Griffin was sworn and testified as a
witness for the defendant. Mr. Griffin identified himself
as a man 58 years old and a resident of Saginaw, Michi-
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gan, and that he was employed as Chief Metallurgist for
the Saginaw Steering Gear Division of General Motors
Corporation (R. 332, 333). Mr. Griffin is a graduate
metallurgist and he has followed that profession with
General :Motors Corporation for his entire career (R.
333). The Saginaw Steering Gear builds steering gears
for General Motors and for various other manufacturers, including Ford and Studebaker (R. 333).
Mr. Griffin detailed the manufacture of this Pitman
sector shaft from the steel mill to the finished product.
The shaft is made from a 6120 S.A.E. steel which is
purchased in 11;4" hot rolled bars from the steel mill.
Billet samples from the steel mill are taken by Saginaw
Steering for examination and analysis and they also receive the analysis reports of the steel mill as it is sampled
throughout the heats (R. 335, 336). When the bars are
delivered by the steel mill and the particular heat and
ingot from which it came is identified by a metal tag and
the material is not used until it is released as satisfactory
by the Saginaw Laboratory, which gives the heat a code
number which may be identified upon the :finished part
(R. 337).
Mr. Griffin then continued in his testimony to detail
the production methods and procedures used in the
Saginaw Steering Division, including the forming of the
metal, the heat treatment, and the placing of the splines
upon the shaft. He further described how the parts are
assembled (R. 338, 339, 340).
19
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The defendant, General Motors Corporation, then .
produced as a witness Dr. Hyrum E. Flanders. Dr.
Flanders identified himself as a professor of metallurgy
at the University of Utah and related extensive education and experience in this field ( R. 391). In the month
of June 1952 Exhibits G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 were brought
to Mr. Flanders by one, Mr. Fouts, .Mr. Griffin of the
Saginaw Steering, and Mr. King, counsel for plaintiff
(R. 391, 392). Mr. Flanders and these persons met with
Mr. Bradford, Chemical Analyst of the University of
Utah, to determine a procedure to follow in the examination of the part for the consideration of the existence
of a defect (R. 392). As a result of the examinations
made by Dr. Flanders, he arrived at the opinion that
there was no defect whatsoever in the metal. He partticularly noticed that the splines on Exhibit G-1 were
twisted and he stated that this was caused by twisting
that had taken place prior to the failure (R. 392, 393).
A careful examination of the surface revealed no oxidation which might have been present before the fracture
had taken place and at the trial he observed some superficial rust which was not present at the time of his examination (R. 393).
Mr. Arthur W. Harris was then presented and sworn
on behalf of the defendant, General Motors Corporation.
Mr. Harris was a resident of Detroit, Michigan, who had
worked for General Motors Corporation for a period
over thirty years and has been engaged by this company
in designing and general engineering testing work, and
at the time of the trial he was a field product engineer.
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A good part of the experience of Mr. Harris has been
to study vehicles under certain conditions to investigate
difficulties and trouble-determine the cause and effect
and to make recommendations to the Engineering Department ( R. 401).
Exhibit "C" was examined by Mr. Harris and the
marks made by a vehicle as shown on Exhibit '' C '' had
received his consideration. It was the opinion of Mr.
Harris that the marks as shown were typical of a "high
speed tramp." (R. 402). These marks could be made by
a vehicle while there was a proper connection in the
vehicle between the steering wheel and the front wheels.
Mr. Harris then described the activity of a motor
vehicle that makes this type of mark, and he testified
that by reason of the spacing of the marks, as testified
in plaintiff's case by Mr. Collins, that the speed of a
vehicle to make such marks would be approximately 70
miles an hour (R. 404). Mr. Harris then described to
the jury how the marks were made on the highway as
the vehicle turned abruptly to the left and left the highway on that side, and accounted for the appearance and
disappearance of the various skid marks (R. 405).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The trial court erred in denying motion of defendant General Motors Corporation for dismissal at
the conclusion of plaintiff's case.
2. The trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant General Motors Corporation.
21
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3. The trial court erred in denying motion of defendant General Motors Corporation to set aside verdict
and enter judgment for said defendant.
4. The trial court erred in denying motion of defendant General Motors Corporation for a new trial.
5. The trial court erred in permitting the witness
Gordon Wertsderfer, over objection of defendant General Motors Corporation, to testify concerning opinions
and conclusions of said witness.
6. The trial court erred in permitting the witness
Frank Snyder, over objection of defendant General
Motors Corporation, to testify concerning opinions and
conclusions of said witness.
ARGUMENT
POINTS 1, 2, 3 and 4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
MOTION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION FOR DISMISSAL AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE; THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A
VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL
MOTORS CORPORATION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND ENTER JUDGMENT FOR SAID DEFENDANT; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
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ING MOTION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
So that this Honorable Court may properly appraise
the evidence in support of plaintiff's theory in the case
and the lack of evidence to support it, we have set out
the evidence at some length in support of our position
that the verdict is not supported by the evidence and
contrary to the law, and the trial court should have
granted defendant's motion for a judgment in its favor.
As stated in Hooper vs. General Motors,---------- Utah
________ , to impose liability on a manufacturer or assembler
of an automobile certain necessary elements must be
made out, and plaintiff is required to show:
1. A defective wheel at the time of automobile
assembly.

2. Such defect being discovered by reasonable Inspection.
3. Injury caused by failure of the wheel due to its
defective condition.
1. There was no substantial evidence that the pit·man sector shaft was defective at the time of manufacture or assembly by the defendant General Motors
Corporation.

It is true that the elleged expert witnesses for the
plaintiff, Mr. Wertderfer and Mr. Snyder, testified that
they discovered rust and oxidation on the part, and that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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such a condition constituted a "flaw", in their opinion.
(At this point it is interesting to note that a careful
examination of the testimony of these witnesses placed
the alleged rust or oxidation on entirely different places
on the face of the fractured part.) Mr. Wertsderfer
stated that it had taken six weeks to discolor the metal
(R. 174) and Mr. Snyder stated that any opinion on his
part as to the period of time could only be a guess (R.
229). Further, the witness Snyder stated that the metal
from which the part was made was, in his opinion, defective at the time of its manufacture by the steel mill
(R. 229). This opinion, which was allowed over defendant's objection, was utterly destroyed by the witness
himself. His only experience in the manufacture of steel
was some fifty years ago while employed in a steel mill,
and the nature, type and duration of his employment
and experience at that time was not shown (R. 217, 218).
Also this same witness testified:
''A. It's been so long since I've been around
an open hearth. I haven't been around an openhearth furnace since, let's see, 1901. Yes, say,
19- well, since 1905, anyway.

'' Q. And it's probably a lot different today,
is it not1
''A. Oh, sure. That's the reason I ain't going
to say what this steel's made of or what.

"Q. So the answer is you really have no
knowledge of the mill processes of manufacturingT
"A. I know they make steel now that we
didn't have in the early days. (R. 238).
""

""

...
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"Q. Now, you mentioned that you have not
looked at these parts under a glass.
''A. No, I haven't. That might change my
opinion on it.
'' Q. Would you care to look at these parts
under a glass, Mr. Snyder1

''A. I can't pass an opinion now, after this
length of time. Why, hell, I wouldn't give an
opinion on it.
"Q. You wouldn't give one at all now¥
"A. No." (R. 244, 245.)
*

*

*

*

*

"Q. I see. You have never paid any attention
to examining them 1
''A. No, I've never made a study of it. It's
really none of my business.'' (R. 245.)
Thus the testimony of Mr. Snyder offered no real
probative value to the plaintiff's case and no judgment
can be predicated upon such' incompetent, unreliable
and inconclusive testimony.
No evidence was offered by plaintiff as to when the
truck was manufactured and assembled by General
Motors Corporation, or when it left their possession. It
is perfectly possible that the truck left the possession
of this defendant a long time before the six weeks mentioned by the witness Wertsderfer. Plaintiff cannot
complain of its failure to produce this evidence as this
information was easily available and accessible to
plaintiff.
25
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If any question remains as to the plaintiff's proof,
the court's attention is directed to the testimony of
Dr. Parker that the part was good and sound in all
respects, and that its fracture was due to a sudden and
great overload. This witness, an eminent and qualified
metallurgist from the University of California, was
presented by the plaintiff.
No substantial evidence In the entire record supports the necessary proof of the first element set forth.
2. There was no evidence that such defect, if it

existed at all, was discoverable by reasonable inspection.
A search of the record for any evidence to support
this proposition is in vain, and, on the contrary, the
defendant General Motors Corporation revealed at the
trial its inspections and precautionary method of manufacture. The metal bars were purchased from the steel
mill, with a constant check on its quality, from the pouring of the ingots at the mill to its receipt by General
Motors Corporation (R. 335, 336, 337). Visual, manual
and scientific tests and controls were carefully used in
the fabrication of the part by this defendant (R. 337 to
342, incl). No challenge was made by plaintiff concerning
the propriety as to these methods by General Motors,
nor did the plaintiff claim any failure on the part of
General Motors Corporation to properly perform its
obligations in this respect. No evidence was introduced
by plaintiff, or anyone else, even suggesting that the
procedures as outlined by Mr. Griffith of the Saginaw
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Steering Gear Company were inadequate or improper.
Both of plaintiff's alleged experts, W ertsderfer and
Snyder, properly ignored this subject, as they both admittedly had no knowledge of the automotive industry
or its methods, processes or problems. Again, Professor
Parker, produced by this plaintiff, stated that the type
and character of the metal used was perfectly proper
for the use to which it was applied.
3. No substantial evidence was produced by the
plaintiff that the injury to plOJintiff was caused by the
fa,ilure of the pitman sector shaft due to its defective
condition.

In discussing the proposition of whether the injury
to plaintiff was caused by the failure of the pitman sector
shaft due to its defective condition, we can begin with
the basic proposition that the causal connection between
the alleged negligent act of the defendant and the injury
to plaintiff is never presumed, and that this is a subject
that plaintiff is required to prove affirmatively.
Jackson vs. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 Pac. 2d
566.
The plaintiff testified that in proceeding down Sacramento Pass he had rounded a curve to the right and
had gotten himself over to the left of the center line of
the highway, and as he noticed himself over on the lefthand side of the road he pulled himself back on the
righthand side (R. 127). It is apparent that at this time
he had control of his steering. The plaintiff then testified
27
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that he again caught himself in the middle of the road
and turned it back to the right side of the road (R. 127).
At this time he had control of his steering. The vehicle
being driven by plaintiff then gradually went over to the
right side of the road until the right wheel was off the
surfaced portion of the highway. See Exhibit C. The
plaintiff has no idea back .of this point where he lost
control of the steering, but on cross-examination he
stated that he made this statement upon a prior deposition:

"Q. I will ask you, Mr. Northern, whether or
not, on that occasion, you made this statement:
'No sir. When I tried to turn it back to the right
again, after pulling it from the right side, pull
it to the left, and after trying to straighten it
back to the right again, I could not straighten
it. That's when I hit the brakes.'
''A. Yes sir. I did.

"Q. And right after that do you recall this
question: 'And what was the sensation on the
steering wheel as you tried to pull it back from
the right side of the road 1"
'A. Well just wasn't nothing to turn it back
with.'

"Q. You made that statement, did you noU
''A. Yes sir, I did.
''Q. And will you listen to the following questions and answers, Mr. Northern, on the same
occasion on the deposition: 'Q. You didn't try
to spin it at all back~'
" 'A. Well it done happened, sir. Didn't have
enough time to do all that. Just steering it, I
28
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imaging around eight, ten inches; something like
that.'

'' 'Q. Then you started tipping over?
'''A. It was going over then.
'' 'Q. You were going over then?
" 'A. Yes sir.'

"Q. Did you testify to that effect upon the
taking of this deposition~
''A. I don't recollect that, sir.

''Q. Do you deny now, Mr. Northern, that you
made such a statement on that occasion?
"A. No sir. I do not deny it. I just don't
recollect it.
'' Q. And you could have made such a statement, is that right?

"A. Possible." (R. 130, 131.)
If, as plaintiff testified, that when the truck was on
the right side of the road with the right wheel on the
shoulder, he was able to "snatch" the truck from this
position, again he had control of his steering, and an
examination of Exhibit 3 will show that at the time he
claims to have lost control of his steering that he was
already tipping over as testified above. Exhibit 3 shows
this vividly by the appearance and disappearance of the
skid marks of the Northern vehicle crossing the highway
immediately before leaving the highway on the left side.
Thus the plaintiff in his own testimony gives a description of being able to control the vehicle right up to the
time it skidded across the highway out of control.
29
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Neither a review of the testimony of the alleged
experts, Mr. Wertsderfer or Mr. Snyder, shows any
evidence from which it is shown or can be inferred that
the part failed prior to the truck being upset. Quite the
contrary, Mr. Wertsderfer testified on cross-examination
that there appeared to be a twist on the splines of the
fractured sector shaft, and that it would take great force
to twist the splines on that part (R. 186). Mr. Snyder
testified that the twist on the splines of the fractured
exhibit meant that there had been an excessive strain
on the part (R. 236). In addition to the foregoing Dr.
Parker stated that the examination of the fractured part
and the twisting of the splines was due to a single overload, caused by a torsional force (R. 293).
The testimony of Professor Parker is the only evidence produced by plaintiff as to the cause of the accident. Neither W ertsderfer, Snyder or Jensen testified
as to the cause of the accident. There was, therefore, not
only a failure to prove causation but positive proof by
pla!intiff to the contrary.
The foregoing is the extent to which the plaintiff
attempted to prove the necessary element of proximate
causation, and the defendant contends that surh element was not proved by either direct evidence or by a
reasonable inference. On the other hand, the defendant
together with plaintiff in its case clearly proved that
the failure of the pitman sector shaft was caused by a
great and sudden overload, by a torsional force and,
according to Dr. Parker, a force of such a character that
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it could not have been exerted by the driver of the
vehicle ( R. 296).
The appellant subscribes to the nature of a cause of
action in the case of a manufacturer's liability as originally determined by the leading case of MacPherson vs.
Buick Jlotor Company, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050,
and as later adopted in the Restatement of the Law of
Torts in Section 388, and as set forth by Justice Wolfe
in the case of Hooper vs. General Motors Corporation,
supra. The defendant seriously contends that all of the
elements of such a cause of action must be affirmatively
proved by plaintiff.
A basic problem of this type of case is the consideration by the Court of two possibilities and the plaintiff
presents the proposition (1) that the broken part caused
the accident and the contention of the defendant (2)
that the part was broken by reason of the accident.
To argue the first possibility one is required to
indulge in a degree of speculation and conjecture not
justified by but contrary to the law and the evidence in
this case as shown by plaintiff's own evidence. Even
though the evidence clearly lends its weight and preponderance in favor of the defendant, if we admit that the
two possibilities are on a parity, the trial court nevertheless erred in its ruling. This court has held that when
a wrong or injury has been brought about from one or
the other of two occurrences either one of which may have
been the sole ~roximate cause, and the defendant
could be responsible for one only, the dcfcndaftt must
31
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's wrong was the sole approximate cause.
This was the holding in Tremelling YS. Southern
Pacific (51 Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80) and consistently followed and later announced in Sumsion vs. Streater,
Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, (132 Pac. (2d) 680).
In the Sumsion case this court stated:
''While deductions may be based on probabilities, the evidence must do more than merely raise
a conjecture or show a probability. Where there
are probabilities the other way equally or more
potent the deductions are mere guesses and the
jury should not be permitted to speculate. The
rule is well established in this jurisdiction that
where 'the proximate cause of the injury is left
to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter
of law.' Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Co., 51
Utah 189, 170 P. 80, 84; Tremelling v. Southern
Pacific Co., 70 Utah 72, 257 P. 1066. Many cases
are cited in support of this proposition and the
court quoted with approval from 29 Cyc. 625
where it is stated: 'The evidence must, however,
do more than merely raise a conjecture or show
a probability as to the cause of the injury, and no
recovery can be had if the evidence leaves it to
conjecture which of two probable causes resulted
in the injury, where defendant was liable for only
one of them.' ''
This court has repeatedly held that the doctrine of
the Tremelling case applies where plaintiff's evidence
shows the two possibilities as to cause.
D. & R G.

Ys.

Ind. Com., 66 Ut. 494, 243 Pac. 800.
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Peterson vs. Richards, 73 Ut. 59, 272 Pac. 229.
In this connection the court's attention is invited
to the case of Fisher vs. Sheppard, 366 Pa. 347, 77 A ( 2d)
417, where a tractor trailer crashed into the rear of a
building and plaintiff alleged that the accident was
caused by a defective sleeve in the differential. That
court said:
"We are of the opinion that the evidence is
not sufficient to establish this basic fact. Certainly, proof of a broken sleeve itself, in the circumstances here presented, will not support a
finding that it ''ras defective prior to the collision
of the tractor with the Fisher building. A finding
that the break resulted from the terrific impact
is equally probable. Where two conclusions can
be had from given circumstances, one of which
would create liability and the other negative liability, a jury may not be permitted to indulge in
conjecture and negligence cannot be. predicated
thereon.''
We are aware that the respondents will point to the
fact that the witnesses Snyder and W ertsderfer testified
that there was a "flaw" in the Pitman sector shaft by
reason of the rust they purported to see. This was true
in the case of Livesley vs. Continental Motors Corp., 331
Mich. 434, 49 N.W. (2d) 365. In this case plaintiffs
asserted that a defective connecting rod in an airplane
engine broke causing the engine to freeze and the subsequent crash. A witness for plaintiff testified in that
case: "It is a flaw in the forging ... definitely it was
not checked. It would have shown up.'' The plaintiff
33
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made further proof in that case than did Mr. Northern.
The Michigan Court stated, as follows:
"We do not overlook the testimony of plaintiff's witness Stevens referring to the break of
the piston end of the connecting rod in question,

''It is a flaw in the forging. * * * definitely it
was not checked. It would have shown up."
But the witness further testified :

"Q. What test do they

make~ ~

''A. Well, I don't understand what they
make, but I understood they run parts as
critical as this through an x-ray machine on
an assembly line to show up flawed parts.
Whether they do on anything as small as this
I am not sure, but they should.

"Q. Do you know anything about the magnaflux process~
''A. No, I don't.''

"It is apparent that his statement, "It would
have shown up,'' is the expression of an opinion
which has no basis of any knowledge of the witness and is without evidentiary force.
''The case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 ,N. Y. 382 (111 N.E. 1050), was brought to
recover damages because of personal injuries
caused by reason of a defective wheel of an automobile sold by defendant to a dealer by whom
the automobile was sold to plaintiff. The wheel
was the product of another manufacturer. The
wheel was defective and the defect was the cause
of the injury to plaintiff. The defect of the whet>l
could have bel'n discovered by reasonable inspection, which inspection was omitted.
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"The opinion in the MacPherson case among
other things stated as follows (111 N.E. 1055) :
"It (defendant) was a manufacturer of automobiles. It was responsible for the finished
product. It was not at liberty to put the
finished product on the market without subjecting the component parts to ordinary and
simple tests. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co.
v. Elliott, 149 U. S. 266, 272, 13 Sup. Ct. 837,
37 L. Ed. 728. Under the charge of the trial
judge nothing more was required of it. The
obligation to inspect must vary with the nature
of the thing to be inspected. The more pro bable the danger the greater the need of caution.''
"In the instant case the testimony shows that
the defect could not have been discovered by
reasonable inspection, thus the instant case is
differentiated from the MacPherson case.
''The New York court further ruled in Smith
v. Peerless Glass Co., 181 N.E. 576, at page 578,
'There was, therefore a duty to use reasonable
care. Reasonable care consists ainong other things
in making such inspections and tests during the
course of manufacture and after the article is
completed as the manufacturer should recognize
as reasonably necessary to secure the production
of a safe article,' with which rule the defendant
in the instant case is shown to have complied.

''It is unnecessary in this case to review exhaustively the authorities as to liability of manufacturer when negligence is shown because the
negligence counted on in the instant case was not
shown.
"For failure to prove the negligence which
plaintiff counted on, plaintiff was without a sufficient case to go to the jury.''
35
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In the instant case there is no evidence that the
defect, if it existed, could have been discovered by a
reasonable inspection by General Motors Corporation, or
that it caused the accident. The Court is reminded that
the witness W ertsderfer testified that a crack in the part
could have been seen if it had been one-thousandth of an
inch (R. 200) and the witness Snyder testified that it
was inside the part (R. 247). It is interesting to note, and
assuming the partial oxidation, that no one for the plaintiff testified that the remaining part where the metal was
joined and not cracked was not capable of performing
properly and that it would have broken in that condition
under normal and reasonable use.
The case of Harward vs. General Motors Corporation, 235 N. C. 88, 68 S. E. (2) 455, was a case where
the plaintiff alleged a defective steering mechanism. The
court in that case stated :
"Whether the failure of the steering gear to
fit as indicated by the plaintiff and his witness
was due to the natural wear or hard and fast
driving or lack of lubrication is left in doubt.
There is a complete absence of testimony that any
cotter key or other essential part of the mechanism was left out, or that any improper parts were
used. There is no substantial evidence that there
was anything wrong with the steering equipment
of the automobile at the time it was sold to thl'
plaintiff, nor is there substantial evidence in the
record which tends to prove that the condition in
which the steering mechanism was found after
the accident was due to all~' fault or negligem·e
either of omission or of commission on the part
of either of the defendants. Shroder v. Barron36
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Dady ~Iot. Co., App. 111 S. W. 2d 66; O'Hara v.
Gen. ·Motors Corp., 35 F. Supp. 319; Bird v. Ford
.l\Iotor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590; Supera v. Moreland
Sales Corp., 56 P. :2d 595; :MacPherson v. Buick
~Iotor Co., :217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050; Davlin
Y. Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 20 Fed. 2d 317.

''X egligence is never presumed from the mere
fact of an accident or injury. The plaintiff has
the burden of establishing by appropriate proof
not only negligence but that such negligence was
the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
The plaintiff must also establish by his evidence
a casual relation between the alleged negligence
and the injury upon which a recovery is sought.
Evidence that merely takes the matter into the
realm of conjecture is insufficient. Rountree v.
Fountain, 203, N. C. 381, 166 S. E. 329; Lynch v.
Telephone Co., 204 N.C. 252, 167 S. E. 847. Plaintiff~s evidence at most raises a suspicion or a
conjecture, but fails to establish actionable negligence or any casual relation between the condition
of the automobile when it was purchased and the
accident resulting in plaintiff's injury more than
nine months later."
It is anticipated that the respondent will argue that
there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could
deduce the necessary ultimate inferences. Thirty years
ago this Court held that while juries are given great
latitude in deducing inferences from established facts,
they nevertheless are not permitted to base an inference
upon an inference and a finding based upon such would
be mere speculation and conjecture. l{arren vs. Bair, 63
Utah 344, 225 Pac. 10g-4. Although such rule has been
the subject of much confusion, this Court has not departed from it.
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We believe that one of the best statements regarding
the question of an inference upon an inference is contained in the case of New York Life Insurance Company
vs. MeNeely, 52 Ariz. 181, 79 Pac. (2d} 948, wherein it
was stated: '' ... the Courts do not mean that under no
circumstances may an inference be drawn from an inference, but rather the prior inferences must be established
to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory rather
than merely by a probability, in order that the last
inference of the probability of the ultimate fact may
be based thereon.''
In applying the facts of the instant case, the plaintiff must rely upon an inference that the alleged "flaw",
if it existed at all, existed at the time the truck was in
the possession of the General Motors Corporation. Upon
this inference we must then further draw the inference
that it was a "flaw" that was discoverable by reasonable
inspection. Again, based upon these two successive inferences, it is necessary to infer that by reason of the
"flaw" the part was so weak that it was unable to withstand normal and reasonable use.
To further carry on this weird sequence and again
based upon the prior deductions, we are asked to infer
that the alleged defective part caused the accident and
that it was not broken during the violence of the accident
itself.
It can readily be seen that in order to reach the
ultimate conclusion necessary to sustain the verdict in
38
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this rase that all of the inferences are at the best but
possibilities and that they are not probabilities nor
established to the exclusion of any other theory.
In discussing the foregoing, the Appellant is aware
of the statement made by Chief Justice Wolfe in the
ease of Hooper vs. General :Motors Corporation, supra,
as follows: ''Certainly, reasonable men from the cumulatiYe factual total could infer, and with the consideration of rim-spider separation may have inferred, that
the ·wheel ·was defective at the time of assembly.'' The
Court is reminded that that case was an appeal by the
plaintiff after a verdict of no cause of action and was
reversed on the basis that a certain instruction was improper and prejudicial.
The records and briefs in that case will show that
there was no issue concerning the elements of a cause
of action of a manufacturer's liability and the necessary
evidence to support such a cause of action. The statement quoted was unnecessary dicta in that case and we
seriously urge this Court to reconsider its effect and
clarify the same. The case does not support the con-clusion of Justice Wolfe "that the wheel was defective
at the time of assembly."
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POINT NO.5
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
THE WITNESS, GORDON WERTSDERFER, OVER
OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION, TO TESTIFY CONCERNING OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF WITNESS.
It is apparent to any tyro that consideration of
problems involving the cause and effect of metal failures
is a highly technical and scientific subject and one which
requires specialized training. Over the defendant's objection the Trial Court allowed the plaintiff to present
the witness Gordon W ertsderfer as an expert and to
testify before the jury concerning his opinions and conclusions. The witness W ertsderfer qualified himself as
a welder, machinist, and construction worker. In addition he related that he had read articles on metallurgy
as published by the American Welding Society and a
concern referred to as the Oxweld Welding Equipment
(R. 170, 171). On the other hand he stated that he had no
knowledge of steering mechanisms for vehicles and that
he had never followed the automobile line (R. 163).

A reading of Mr. Wertsderfer's testimony on Voir
Dire examination will show that he did not post-'es!:-' the
specialized knowledge necessary. It is submitted that
the witness was not qualified and that the ruling of th~
Court was in error.
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POINT NO.6
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
THE WITXESS, FRANK SNYDER, OVER OBJECTIOX OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, TO TESTIFY CONCERNING OPINIONS
AND COXCLUSIONS OF SAID WITNESS.
Over the objection of the defendant, the plaintiff
presented the witness, Frank Snyder, as an expert and
the Court allowed his testimony, which included opinions
and conclusions on a metallurgical subject. The objection to this witness was even more pointed than the
objection to the witness Wertsderfer. The Court is
reminded that the parties stipulated that the record may
be considered as showing objections to all opinions and
conclusions. This was done to expedite the trial. Mr.
Snyder qualified himself as a machinist for over a long
period of years.
On Voir Dire examination the witness admittedly
had done no testing in regard to stress or strain of
metals and had made no special study for the cause of
breaks (R. 220). The same witness testified as follows:
''A. It's been so long since I've been around
an open hearth. I haven't been around an openhearth furnace since, let's see, 1901. Yes, say,
19- well, since 1905, anyway.

"Q. And it's probably a lot different today,
is it not~
"A. Oh, sure. That's the reason I ain't going
to say what this steel's made of or what.
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"Q. So the answer is you really hav~ no
knowledge of the mill processes of manufactunngf
''A. I know they make steel now that we
didn't have in the early days. (R. 238).

*

*

*

*

*

"Q. Now, you mentioned that you have not
looked at these parts under a glass.
"A. No, I haven't. That might change my
opinion on it.
"Q. Would you care to look at these parts
under a glass, Mr. Snyder~
"A. I can't pass an opinion now, after this
length of time. Why, hell, I wouldn't give an
opinion on it.

"Q. You wouldn't give one at all nowT
''A. No. (R. 244, 245.)

*

*

* * *

"Q. I see. You have never paid any attention
to examining them?
''A. No, I've never made a study of it. It's
. really none of my business." (R. 245).
It is apparent and obvious that the witness was not
only unqualified but the lack of qualifications and
necessary knowledge and experience were admitted by
him. The Appellant seriously contends that the subject
of metallurgy and the cause and effect of metal failures
is a subject requiring special and peculiar knowledge
and experience, and that the witness must affirmativPly
show these qualifications. Seward vs. Natural Gas Co.
of New Jersey, 1 N. J. Super. 1:24, 78 A. 2d 129; ( anonico
1
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vs. Cellanese Corporation, 11 N. J. Super. 455, 78 A.
(2d) 411; Mary Jane Stevens Co. vs. First National Bank
Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 Pac. (2d) 1099. Of particular interest is the case of Duntley vs. Inman, Poulsen
& Co., 42 Ore. 334, 70 Pac. 529. In that case the witness
was a mill hand whose duty it was to repair and look
after the pullies. He examined a broken pulley after
~
the accident and upon trial,....asked what caused the pulley
to break. He was not allowed to answer on the basis
that it was not shown that he possessed any special
knowledge on the subject and showed no experience in
the manufacture or testing of machinery of that kind.
The Appellant recognizes the wide discretion of the
Trial Court in determining whether or not a witness is
qualified but submits to this honorable Court that there
was an abuse of such discretion.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM
By Leonard W. Elton
Attorneys for Appellants
September, 1953.
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